Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
Great Debates in Philosophy
1. Auflage November 1995
240 Seiten, Softcover
Wiley & Sons Ltd
Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate,
Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and
moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like
disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct
answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral
framework.
Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to
be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues
that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral
questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like
disagreements about whether the house has a ghost.
Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important,
lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of
moral theory and meta-ethics.
Part I: Moral Relativism (Harman):.
1. Moral Relativism.
2. Social Contracts.
3. Expressing Basic Disagreement.
4. Universality of Practical Reasons?.
5. Judgements about Outsiders.
Part II: Moral Objectivity (Thomson):.
6. Epistemological Arguments for Moral Skepticism.
7. Emotivism.
8. Evaluations and Directives.
Part III: Responses:.
9. Harman's Response to Thomson's Part II.
10. Thomson's Response to Harman's Part I.
Bibliography.
of Princeton. His publications include Thought (1973),
The Nature of Morality (1977), and Change in View
(1986).
Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include The
Realm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk
(1986).
