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Security Engineering

A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems

Anderson, Ross

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3. Auflage Januar 2021
1232 Seiten, Hardcover
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ISBN: 978-1-119-64278-7
John Wiley & Sons

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Now that there's software in everything, how can you make anything secure? Understand how to engineer dependable systems with this newly updated classic

In Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, Third Edition Cambridge University professor Ross Anderson updates his classic textbook and teaches readers how to design, implement, and test systems to withstand both error and attack.

This book became a best-seller in 2001 and helped establish the discipline of security engineering. By the second edition in 2008, underground dark markets had let the bad guys specialize and scale up; attacks were increasingly on users rather than on technology. The book repeated its success by showing how security engineers can focus on usability.

Now the third edition brings it up to date for 2020. As people now go online from phones more than laptops, most servers are in the cloud, online advertising drives the Internet and social networks have taken over much human interaction, many patterns of crime and abuse are the same, but the methods have evolved. Ross Anderson explores what security engineering means in 2020, including:
* How the basic elements of cryptography, protocols, and access control translate to the new world of phones, cloud services, social media and the Internet of Things
* Who the attackers are - from nation states and business competitors through criminal gangs to stalkers and playground bullies
* What they do - from phishing and carding through SIM swapping and software exploits to DDoS and fake news
* Security psychology, from privacy through ease-of-use to deception
* The economics of security and dependability - why companies build vulnerable systems and governments look the other way
* How dozens of industries went online - well or badly
* How to manage security and safety engineering in a world of agile development - from reliability engineering to DevSecOps

The third edition of Security Engineering ends with a grand challenge: sustainable security. As we build ever more software and connectivity into safety-critical durable goods like cars and medical devices, how do we design systems we can maintain and defend for decades? Or will everything in the world need monthly software upgrades, and become unsafe once they stop?

Preface to the Third Edition xxxvii

Preface to the Second Edition xli

Preface to the First Edition xliii

Formy daughter, and other lawyers... xlvii

Foreword xlix

Part I

Chapter 1 What Is Security Engineering? 3

1.1 Introduction 3

1.2 A framework 4

1.3 Example 1 - a bank 6

1.4 Example 2 - a military base 7

1.5 Example 3 - a hospital 8

1.6 Example 4 - the home 10

1.7 Definitions 11

1.8 Summary 16

Chapter 2 Who Is the Opponent? 17

2.1 Introduction 17

2.2 Spies 19

2.2.1 The Five Eyes 19

2.2.1.1 Prism 19

2.2.1.2 Tempora 20

2.2.1.3 Muscular 21

2.2.1.4 Special collection 22

2.2.1.5 Bullrun and Edgehill 22

2.2.1.6 Xkeyscore 23

2.2.1.7 Longhaul 24

2.2.1.8 Quantum 25

2.2.1.9 CNE 25

2.2.1.10 The analyst's viewpoint 27

2.2.1.11 Offensive operations 28

2.2.1.12 Attack scaling 29

2.2.2 China 30

2.2.3 Russia 35

2.2.4 The rest 38

2.2.5 Attribution 40

2.3 Crooks 41

2.3.1 Criminal infrastructure 42

2.3.1.1 Botnet herders 42

2.3.1.2 Malware devs 44

2.3.1.3 Spam senders 45

2.3.1.4 Bulk account compromise 45

2.3.1.5 Targeted attackers 46

2.3.1.6 Cashout gangs 46

2.3.1.7 Ransomware 47

2.3.2 Attacks on banking and payment systems 47

2.3.3 Sectoral cybercrime ecosystems 49

2.3.4 Internal attacks 49

2.3.5 CEO crimes 49

2.3.6 Whistleblowers 50

2.4 Geeks 52

2.5 The swamp 53

2.5.1 Hacktivism and hate campaigns 54

2.5.2 Child sex abuse material 55

2.5.3 School and workplace bullying 57

2.5.4 Intimate relationship abuse 57

2.6 Summary 59

Research problems 60

Further reading 61

Chapter 3 Psychology and Usability 63

3.1 Introduction 63

3.2 Insights from psychology research 64

3.2.1 Cognitive psychology 65

3.2.2 Gender, diversity and interpersonal variation 68

3.2.3 Social psychology 70

3.2.3.1 Authority and its abuse 71

3.2.3.2 The bystander effect 72

3.2.4 The social-brain theory of deception 73

3.2.5 Heuristics, biases and behavioural economics 76

3.2.5.1 Prospect theory and risk misperception 77

3.2.5.2 Present bias and hyperbolic discounting 78

3.2.5.3 Defaults and nudges 79

3.2.5.4 The default to intentionality 79

3.2.5.5 The affect heuristic 80

3.2.5.6 Cognitive dissonance 81

3.2.5.7 The risk thermostat 81

3.3 Deception in practice 81

3.3.1 The salesman and the scamster 82

3.3.2 Social engineering 84

3.3.3 Phishing 86

3.3.4 Opsec 88

3.3.5 Deception research 89

3.4 Passwords 90

3.4.1 Password recovery 92

3.4.2 Password choice 94

3.4.3 Difficulties with reliable password entry 94

3.4.4 Difficulties with remembering the password 95

3.4.4.1 Naïve choice 96

3.4.4.2 User abilities and training 96

3.4.4.3 Design errors 98

3.4.4.4 Operational failures 100

3.4.4.5 Social-engineering attacks 101

3.4.4.6 Customer education 102

3.4.4.7 Phishing warnings 103

3.4.5 System issues 104

3.4.6 Can you deny service? 105

3.4.7 Protecting oneself or others? 105

3.4.8 Attacks on password entry 106

3.4.8.1 Interface design 106

3.4.8.2 Trusted path, and bogus terminals 107

3.4.8.3 Technical defeats of password retry counters 107

3.4.9 Attacks on password storage 108

3.4.9.1 One-way encryption 109

3.4.9.2 Password cracking 109

3.4.9.3 Remote password checking 109

3.4.10 Absolute limits 110

3.4.11 Using a password manager 111

3.4.12 Will we ever get rid of passwords? 113

3.5 CAPTCHAs 115

3.6 Summary 116

Research problems 117

Further reading 118

Chapter 4 Protocols 119

4.1 Introduction 119

4.2 Password eavesdropping risks 120

4.3 Who goes there? - simple authentication 122

4.3.1 Challenge and response 124

4.3.2 Two-factor authentication 128

4.3.3 The MIG-in-the-middle attack 129

4.3.4 Reflection attacks 132

4.4 Manipulating the message 133

4.5 Changing the environment 134

4.6 Chosen protocol attacks 135

4.7 Managing encryption keys 136

4.7.1 The resurrecting duckling 137

4.7.2 Remote key management 137

4.7.3 The Needham-Schroeder protocol 138

4.7.4 Kerberos 139

4.7.5 Practical key management 141

4.8 Design assurance 141

4.9 Summary 143

Research problems 143

Further reading 144

Chapter 5 Cryptography 145

5.1 Introduction 145

5.2 Historical background 146

5.2.1 An early stream cipher - the Vigenère 147

5.2.2 The one-time pad 148

5.2.3 An early block cipher - Playfair 150

5.2.4 Hash functions 152

5.2.5 Asymmetric primitives 154

5.3 Security models 155

5.3.1 Random functions - hash functions 157

5.3.1.1 Properties 157

5.3.1.2 The birthday theorem 158

5.3.2 Random generators - stream ciphers 159

5.3.3 Random permutations - block ciphers 161

5.3.4 Public key encryption and trapdoor one-way permutations 163

5.3.5 Digital signatures 164

5.4 Symmetric crypto algorithms 165

5.4.1 SP-networks 165

5.4.1.1 Block size 166

5.4.1.2 Number of rounds 166

5.4.1.3 Choice of S-boxes 167

5.4.1.4 Linear cryptanalysis 167

5.4.1.5 Differential cryptanalysis 168

5.4.2 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 169

5.4.3 Feistel ciphers 171

5.4.3.1 The Luby-Rackoff result 173

5.4.3.2 DES 173

5.5 Modes of operation 175

5.5.1 How not to use a block cipher 176

5.5.2 Cipher block chaining 177

5.5.3 Counter encryption 178

5.5.4 Legacy stream cipher modes 178

5.5.5 Message authentication code 179

5.5.6 Galois counter mode 180

5.5.7 XTS 180

5.6 Hash functions 181

5.6.1 Common hash functions 181

5.6.2 Hash function applications - HMAC, commitments and updating 183

5.7 Asymmetric crypto primitives 185

5.7.1 Cryptography based on factoring 185

5.7.2 Cryptography based on discrete logarithms 188

5.7.2.1 One-way commutative encryption 189

5.7.2.2 Diffie-Hellman key establishment 190

5.7.2.3 ElGamal digital signature and DSA 192

5.7.3 Elliptic curve cryptography 193

5.7.4 Certification authorities 194

5.7.5 TLS 195

5.7.5.1 TLS uses 196

5.7.5.2 TLS security 196

5.7.5.3 TLS 1.3 197

5.7.6 Other public-key protocols 197

5.7.6.1 Code signing 197

5.7.6.2 PGP/GPG 198

5.7.6.3 QUIC 199

5.7.7 Special-purpose primitives 199

5.7.8 How strong are asymmetric cryptographic primitives? 200

5.7.9 What else goes wrong 202

5.8 Summary 203

Research problems 204

Further reading 204

Chapter 6 Access Control 207

6.1 Introduction 207

6.2 Operating system access controls 209

6.2.1 Groups and roles 210

6.2.2 Access control lists 211

6.2.3 Unix operating system security 212

6.2.4 Capabilities 214

6.2.5 DAC and MAC 215

6.2.6 Apple's macOS 217

6.2.7 iOS 217

6.2.8 Android 218

6.2.9 Windows 219

6.2.10 Middleware 222

6.2.10.1 Database access controls 222

6.2.10.2 Browsers 223

6.2.11 Sandboxing 224

6.2.12 Virtualisation 225

6.3 Hardware protection 227

6.3.1 Intel processors 228

6.3.2 Arm processors 230

6.4 What goes wrong 231

6.4.1 Smashing the stack 232

6.4.2 Other technical attacks 234

6.4.3 User interface failures 236

6.4.4 Remedies 237

6.4.5 Environmental creep 238

6.5 Summary 239

Research problems 240

Further reading 240

Chapter 7 Distributed Systems 243

7.1 Introduction 243

7.2 Concurrency 244

7.2.1 Using old data versus paying to propagate state 245

7.2.2 Locking to prevent inconsistent updates 246

7.2.3 The order of updates 247

7.2.4 Deadlock 248

7.2.5 Non-convergent state 249

7.2.6 Secure time 250

7.3 Fault tolerance and failure recovery 251

7.3.1 Failure models 252

7.3.1.1 Byzantine failure 252

7.3.1.2 Interaction with fault tolerance 253

7.3.2 What is resilience for? 254

7.3.3 At what level is the redundancy? 255

7.3.4 Service-denial attacks 257

7.4 Naming 259

7.4.1 The Needham naming principles 260

7.4.2 What else goes wrong 263

7.4.2.1 Naming and identity 264

7.4.2.2 Cultural assumptions 265

7.4.2.3 Semantic content of names 267

7.4.2.4 Uniqueness of names 268

7.4.2.5 Stability of names and addresses 269

7.4.2.6 Restrictions on the use of names 269

7.4.3 Types of name 270

7.5 Summary 271

Research problems 272

Further reading 273

Chapter 8 Economics 275

8.1 Introduction 275

8.2 Classical economics 276

8.2.1 Monopoly 278

8.3 Information economics 281

8.3.1 Why information markets are different 281

8.3.2 The value of lock-in 282

8.3.3 Asymmetric information 284

8.3.4 Public goods 285

8.4 Game theory 286

8.4.1 The prisoners' dilemma 287

8.4.2 Repeated and evolutionary games 288

8.5 Auction theory 291

8.6 The economics of security and dependability 293

8.6.1 Why is Windows so insecure? 294

8.6.2 Managing the patching cycle 296

8.6.3 Structural models of attack and defence 298

8.6.4 The economics of lock-in, tying and DRM 300

8.6.5 Antitrust law and competition policy 302

8.6.6 Perversely motivated guards 304

8.6.7 Economics of privacy 305

8.6.8 Organisations and human behaviour 307

8.6.9 Economics of cybercrime 308

8.7 Summary 310

Research problems 311

Further reading 311

Part II

Chapter 9 Multilevel Security 315

9.1 Introduction 315

9.2 What is a security policy model? 316

9.3 Multilevel security policy 318

9.3.1 The Anderson report 319

9.3.2 The Bell-LaPadula model 320

9.3.3 The standard criticisms of Bell-LaPadula 321

9.3.4 The evolution of MLS policies 323

9.3.5 The Biba model 325

9.4 Historical examples of MLS systems 326

9.4.1 SCOMP 326

9.4.2 Data diodes 327

9.5 MAC: from MLS to IFC and integrity 329

9.5.1 Windows 329

9.5.2 SELinux 330

9.5.3 Embedded systems 330

9.6 What goes wrong 331

9.6.1 Composability 331

9.6.2 The cascade problem 332

9.6.3 Covert channels 333

9.6.4 The threat from malware 333

9.6.5 Polyinstantiation 334

9.6.6 Practical problems with MLS 335

9.7 Summary 337

Research problems 338

Further reading 339

Chapter 10 Boundaries 341

10.1 Introduction 341

10.2 Compartmentation and the lattice model 344

10.3 Privacy for tigers 346

10.4 Health record privacy 349

10.4.1 The threat model 351

10.4.2 The BMA security policy 353

10.4.3 First practical steps 356

10.4.4 What actually goes wrong 357

10.4.4.1 Emergency care 358

10.4.4.2 Resilience 359

10.4.4.3 Secondary uses 359

10.4.5 Confidentiality - the future 362

10.4.6 Ethics 365

10.4.7 Social care and education 367

10.4.8 The Chinese Wall 369

10.5 Summary 371

Research problems 372

Further reading 373

Chapter 11 Inference Control 375

11.1 Introduction 375

11.2 The early history of inference control 377

11.2.1 The basic theory of inference control 378

11.2.1.1 Query set size control 378

11.2.1.2 Trackers 379

11.2.1.3 Cell suppression 379

11.2.1.4 Other statistical disclosure control mechanisms 380

11.2.1.5 More sophisticated query controls 381

11.2.1.6 Randomization 382

11.2.2 Limits of classical statistical security 383

11.2.3 Active attacks 384

11.2.4 Inference control in rich medical data 385

11.2.5 The third wave: preferences and search 388

11.2.6 The fourth wave: location and social 389

11.3 Differential privacy 392

11.4 Mind the gap? 394

11.4.1 Tactical anonymity and its problems 395

11.4.2 Incentives 398

11.4.3 Alternatives 399

11.4.4 The dark side 400

11.5 Summary 401

Research problems 402

Further reading 402

Chapter 12 Banking and Bookkeeping 405

12.1 Introduction 405

12.2 Bookkeeping systems 406

12.2.1 Double-entry bookkeeping 408

12.2.2 Bookkeeping in banks 408

12.2.3 The Clark-Wilson security policy model 410

12.2.4 Designing internal controls 411

12.2.5 Insider frauds 415

12.2.6 Executive frauds 416

12.2.6.1 The post office case 418

12.2.6.2 Other failures 419

12.2.6.3 Ecological validity 420

12.2.6.4 Control tuning and corporate governance 421

12.2.7 Finding the weak spots 422

12.3 Interbank payment systems 424

12.3.1 A telegraphic history of E-commerce 424

12.3.2 SWIFT 425

12.3.3 What goes wrong 427

12.4 Automatic teller machines 430

12.4.1 ATM basics 430

12.4.2 What goes wrong 433

12.4.3 Incentives and injustices 437

12.5 Credit cards 438

12.5.1 Credit card fraud 439

12.5.2 Online card fraud 440

12.5.3 3DS 443

12.5.4 Fraud engines 444

12.6 EMV payment cards 445

12.6.1 Chip cards 445

12.6.1.1 Static data authentication 446

12.6.1.2 ICVVs, DDA and CDA 450

12.6.1.3 The No-PIN attack 451

12.6.2 The preplay attack 452

12.6.3 Contactless 454

12.7 Online banking 457

12.7.1 Phishing 457

12.7.2 CAP 458

12.7.3 Banking malware 459

12.7.4 Phones as second factors 459

12.7.5 Liability 461

12.7.6 Authorised push payment fraud 462

12.8 Nonbank payments 463

12.8.1 M-Pesa 463

12.8.2 Other phone payment systems 464

12.8.3 Sofort, and open banking 465

12.9 Summary 466

Research problems 466

Further reading 468

Chapter 13 Locks and Alarms 471

13.1 Introduction 471

13.2 Threats and barriers 472

13.2.1 Threat model 473

13.2.2 Deterrence 474

13.2.3 Walls and barriers 476

13.2.4 Mechanical locks 478

13.2.5 Electronic locks 482

13.3 Alarms 484

13.3.1 How not to protect a painting 485

13.3.2 Sensor defeats 486

13.3.3 Feature interactions 488

13.3.4 Attacks on communications 489

13.3.5 Lessons learned 493

13.4 Summary 494

Research problems 495

Further reading 495

Chapter 14 Monitoring and Metering 497

14.1 Introduction 497

14.2 Prepayment tokens 498

14.2.1 Utility metering 499

14.2.2 How the STS system works 501

14.2.3 What goes wrong 502

14.2.4 Smart meters and smart grids 504

14.2.5 Ticketing fraud 508

14.3 Taxi meters, tachographs and truck speed limiters 509

14.3.1 The tachograph 509

14.3.2 What goes wrong 511

14.3.2.1 How most tachograph manipulation is done 511

14.3.2.2 Tampering with the supply 512

14.3.2.3 Tampering with the instrument 512

14.3.2.4 High-tech attacks 513

14.3.3 Digital tachographs 514

14.3.3.1 System-level problems 515

14.3.3.2 Other problems 516

14.3.4 Sensor defeats and third-generation devices 518

14.3.5 The fourth generation - smart tachographs 518

14.4 Curfew tags: GPS as policeman 519

14.5 Postage meters 522

14.6 Summary 526

Research problems 527

Further reading 527

Chapter 15 Nuclear Command and Control 529

15.1 Introduction 529

15.2 The evolution of command and control 532

15.2.1 The Kennedy memorandum 532

15.2.2 Authorization, environment, intent 534

15.3 Unconditionally secure authentication 534

15.4 Shared control schemes 536

15.5 Tamper resistance and PALs 538

15.6 Treaty verification 540

15.7 What goes wrong 541

15.7.1 Nuclear accidents 541

15.7.2 Interaction with cyberwar 542

15.7.3 Technical failures 543

15.8 Secrecy or openness? 544

15.9 Summary 545

Research problems 546

Further reading 546

Chapter 16 Security Printing and Seals 549

16.1 Introduction 549

16.2 History 550

16.3 Security printing 551

16.3.1 Threat model 552

16.3.2 Security printing techniques 553

16.4 Packaging and seals 557

16.4.1 Substrate properties 558

16.4.2 The problems of glue 558

16.4.3 PIN mailers 559

16.5 Systemic vulnerabilities 560

16.5.1 Peculiarities of the threat model 562

16.5.2 Anti-gundecking measures 563

16.5.3 The effect of random failure 564

16.5.4 Materials control 564

16.5.5 Not protecting the right things 565

16.5.6 The cost and nature of inspection 566

16.6 Evaluation methodology 567

16.7 Summary 569

Research problems 569

Further reading 570

Chapter 17 Biometrics 571

17.1 Introduction 571

17.2 Handwritten signatures 572

17.3 Face recognition 575

17.4 Fingerprints 579

17.4.1 Verifying positive or negative identity claims 581

17.4.2 Crime scene forensics 584

17.5 Iris codes 588

17.6 Voice recognition and morphing 590

17.7 Other systems 591

17.8 What goes wrong 593

17.9 Summary 596

Research problems 597

Further reading 597

Chapter 18 Tamper Resistance 599

18.1 Introduction 599

18.2 History 601

18.3 Hardware security modules 601

18.4 Evaluation 607

18.5 Smartcards and other security chips 609

18.5.1 History 609

18.5.2 Architecture 610

18.5.3 Security evolution 611

18.5.4 Random number generators and PUFs 621

18.5.5 Larger chips 624

18.5.6 The state of the art 628

18.6 The residual risk 630

18.6.1 The trusted interface problem 630

18.6.2 Conflicts 631

18.6.3 The lemons market, risk dumping and evaluation games 632

18.6.4 Security-by-obscurity 632

18.6.5 Changing environments 633

18.7 So what should one protect? 634

18.8 Summary 636

Research problems 636

Further reading 636

Chapter 19 Side Channels 639

19.1 Introduction 639

19.2 Emission security 640

19.2.1 History 641

19.2.2 Technical surveillance and countermeasures 642

19.3 Passive attacks 645

19.3.1 Leakage through power and signal cables 645

19.3.2 Leakage through RF signals 645

19.3.3 What goes wrong 649

19.4 Attacks between and within computers 650

19.4.1 Timing analysis 651

19.4.2 Power analysis 652

19.4.3 Glitching and differential fault analysis 655

19.4.4 Rowhammer, CLKscrew and Plundervolt 656

19.4.5 Meltdown, Spectre and other enclave side channels 657

19.5 Environmental side channels 659

19.5.1 Acoustic side channels 659

19.5.2 Optical side channels 661

19.5.3 Other side-channels 661

19.6 Social side channels 663

19.7 Summary 663

Research problems 664

Further reading 664

Chapter 20 Advanced Cryptographic Engineering 667

20.1 Introduction 667

20.2 Full-disk encryption 668

20.3 Signal 670

20.4 Tor 674

20.5 HSMs 677

20.5.1 The xor-to-null-key attack 677

20.5.2 Attacks using backwards compatibility and time-memory tradeoffs 678

20.5.3 Differential protocol attacks 679

20.5.4 The EMV attack 681

20.5.5 Hacking the HSMs in CAs and clouds 681

20.5.6 Managing HSM risks 681

20.6 Enclaves 682

20.7 Blockchains 685

20.7.1 Wallets 688

20.7.2 Miners 689

20.7.3 Smart contracts 689

20.7.4 Off-chain payment mechanisms 691

20.7.5 Exchanges, cryptocrime and regulation 692

20.7.6 Permissioned blockchains 695

20.8 Crypto dreams that failed 695

20.9 Summary 696

Research problems 698

Further reading 698

Chapter 21 Network Attack and Defence 699

21.1 Introduction 699

21.2 Network protocols and service denial 701

21.2.1 BGP security 701

21.2.2 DNS security 703

21.2.3 UDP, TCP, SYN floods and SYN reflection 704

21.2.4 Other amplifiers 705

21.2.5 Other denial-of-service attacks 706

21.2.6 Email - from spies to spammers 706

21.3 The malware menagerie - Trojans, worms and RATs 708

21.3.1 Early history of malware 709

21.3.2 The Internet worm 710

21.3.3 Further malware evolution 711

21.3.4 How malware works 713

21.3.5 Countermeasures 714

21.4 Defense against network attack 715

21.4.1 Filtering: firewalls, censorware and wiretaps 717

21.4.1.1 Packet filtering 718

21.4.1.2 Circuit gateways 718

21.4.1.3 Application proxies 719

21.4.1.4 Ingress versus egress filtering 719

21.4.1.5 Architecture 720

21.4.2 Intrusion detection 722

21.4.2.1 Types of intrusion detection 722

21.4.2.2 General limitations of intrusion detection 724

21.4.2.3 Specific problems detecting network attacks 724

21.5 Cryptography: the ragged boundary 725

21.5.1 SSH 726

21.5.2 Wireless networking at the periphery 727

21.5.2.1 WiFi 727

21.5.2.2 Bluetooth 728

21.5.2.3 HomePlug 729

21.5.2.4 VPNs 729

21.6 CAs and PKI 730

21.7 Topology 733

21.8 Summary 734

Research problems 734

Further reading 735

Chapter 22 Phones 737

22.1 Introduction 737

22.2 Attacks on phone networks 738

22.2.1 Attacks on phone-call metering 739

22.2.2 Attacks on signaling 742

22.2.3 Attacks on switching and configuration 743

22.2.4 Insecure end systems 745

22.2.5 Feature interaction 746

22.2.6 VOIP 747

22.2.7 Frauds by phone companies 748

22.2.8 Security economics of telecomms 749

22.3 Going mobile 750

22.3.1 GSM 751

22.3.2 3G 755

22.3.3 4G 757

22.3.4 5G and beyond 758

22.3.5 General MNO failings 760

22.4 Platform security 761

22.4.1 The Android app ecosystem 763

22.4.1.1 App markets and developers 764

22.4.1.2 Bad Android implementations 764

22.4.1.3 Permissions 766

22.4.1.4 Android malware 767

22.4.1.5 Ads and third-party services 768

22.4.1.6 Pre-installed apps 770

22.4.2 Apple's app ecosystem 770

22.4.3 Cross-cutting issues 774

22.5 Summary 775

Research problems 776

Further reading 776

Chapter 23 Electronic and Information Warfare 777

23.1 Introduction 777

23.2 Basics 778

23.3 Communications systems 779

23.3.1 Signals intelligence techniques 781

23.3.2 Attacks on communications 784

23.3.3 Protection techniques 785

23.3.3.1 Frequency hopping 786

23.3.3.2 DSSS 787

23.3.3.3 Burst communications 788

23.3.3.4 Combining covertness and jam resistance 789

23.3.4 Interaction between civil and military uses 790

23.4 Surveillance and target acquisition 791

23.4.1 Types of radar 792

23.4.2 Jamming techniques 793

23.4.3 Advanced radars and countermeasures 795

23.4.4 Other sensors and multisensor issues 796

23.5 IFF systems 797

23.6 Improvised explosive devices 800

23.7 Directed energy weapons 802

23.8 Information warfare 803

23.8.1 Attacks on control systems 805

23.8.2 Attacks on other infrastructure 808

23.8.3 Attacks on elections and political stability 809

23.8.4 Doctrine 811

23.9 Summary 812

Research problems 813

Further reading 813

Chapter 24 Copyright and DRM 815

24.1 Introduction 815

24.2 Copyright 817

24.2.1 Software 817

24.2.2 Free software, free culture? 823

24.2.3 Books and music 827

24.2.4 Video and pay-TV 828

24.2.4.1 Typical system architecture 829

24.2.4.2 Video scrambling techniques 830

24.2.4.3 Attacks on hybrid scrambling systems 832

24.2.4.4 DVB 836

24.2.5 DVD 837

24.3 DRM on general-purpose computers 838

24.3.1 Windows media rights management 839

24.3.2 FairPlay, HTML5 and other DRM systems 840

24.3.3 Software obfuscation 841

24.3.4 Gaming, cheating, and DRM 843

24.3.5 Peer-to-peer systems 845

24.3.6 Managing hardware design rights 847

24.4 Information hiding 848

24.4.1 Watermarks and copy generation management 849

24.4.2 General information hiding techniques 849

24.4.3 Attacks on copyright marking schemes 851

24.5 Policy 854

24.5.1 The IP lobby 857

24.5.2 Who benefits? 859

24.6 Accessory control 860

24.7 Summary 862

Research problems 862

Further reading 863

Chapter 25 New Directions? 865

25.1 Introduction 865

25.2 Autonomous and remotely-piloted vehicles 866

25.2.1 Drones 866

25.2.2 Self-driving cars 867

25.2.3 The levels and limits of automation 869

25.2.4 How to hack a self-driving car 872

25.3 AI / ML 874

25.3.1 ML and security 875

25.3.2 Attacks on ML systems 876

25.3.3 ML and society 879

25.4 PETS and operational security 882

25.4.1 Anonymous messaging devices 885

25.4.2 Social support 887

25.4.3 Living off the land 890

25.4.4 Putting it all together 891

25.4.5 The name's Bond. James Bond 893

25.5 Elections 895

25.5.1 The history of voting machines 896

25.5.2 Hanging chads 896

25.5.3 Optical scan 898

25.5.4 Software independence 899

25.5.5 Why electronic elections are hard 900

25.6 Summary 904

Research problems 904

Further reading 905

Part III

Chapter 26 Surveillance or Privacy? 909

26.1 Introduction 909

26.2 Surveillance 912

26.2.1 The history of government wiretapping 912

26.2.2 Call data records (CDRs) 916

26.2.3 Search terms and location data 919

26.2.4 Algorithmic processing 920

26.2.5 ISPs and CSPs 921

26.2.6 The Five Eyes' system of systems 922

26.2.7 The crypto wars 925

26.2.7.1 The back story to crypto policy 926

26.2.7.2 DES and crypto research 927

26.2.7.3 CryptoWar 1 - the Clipper chip 928

26.2.7.4 CryptoWar 2 - going spotty 931

26.2.8 Export control 934

26.3 Terrorism 936

26.3.1 Causes of political violence 936

26.3.2 The psychology of political violence 937

26.3.3 The role of institutions 938

26.3.4 The democratic response 940

26.4 Censorship 941

26.4.1 Censorship by authoritarian regimes 942

26.4.2 Filtering, hate speech and radicalisation 944

26.5 Forensics and rules of evidence 948

26.5.1 Forensics 948

26.5.2 Admissibility of evidence 950

26.5.3 What goes wrong 951

26.6 Privacy and data protection 953

26.6.1 European data protection 953

26.6.2 Privacy regulation in the USA 956

26.6.3 Fragmentation? 958

26.7 Freedom of information 960

26.8 Summary 961

Research problems 962

Further reading 962

Chapter 27 Secure Systems Development 965

27.1 Introduction 965

27.2 Risk management 966

27.3 Lessons from safety-critical systems 969

27.3.1 Safety engineering methodologies 970

27.3.2 Hazard analysis 971

27.3.3 Fault trees and threat trees 971

27.3.4 Failure modes and effects analysis 972

27.3.5 Threat modelling 973

27.3.6 Quantifying risks 975

27.4 Prioritising protection goals 978

27.5 Methodology 980

27.5.1 Top-down design 981

27.5.2 Iterative design: from spiral to agile 983

27.5.3 The secure development lifecycle 985

27.5.4 Gated development 987

27.5.5 Software as a Service 988

27.5.6 From DevOps to DevSecOps 991

27.5.6.1 The Azure ecosystem 991

27.5.6.2 The Google ecosystem 992

27.5.6.3 Creating a learning system 994

27.5.7 The vulnerability cycle 995

27.5.7.1 The CVE system 997

27.5.7.2 Coordinated disclosure 998

27.5.7.3 Security incident and event management 999

27.5.8 Organizational mismanagement of risk 1000

27.6 Managing the team 1004

27.6.1 Elite engineers 1004

27.6.2 Diversity 1005

27.6.3 Nurturing skills and attitudes 1007

27.6.4 Emergent properties 1008

27.6.5 Evolving your workflow 1008

27.6.6 And finally... 1010

27.7 Summary 1010

Research problems 1011

Further reading 1012

Chapter 28 Assurance and Sustainability 1015

28.1 Introduction 1015

28.2 Evaluation 1018

28.2.1 Alarms and locks 1019

28.2.2 Safety evaluation regimes 1019

28.2.3 Medical device safety 1020

28.2.4 Aviation safety 1023

28.2.5 The Orange book 1025

28.2.6 FIPS 140 and HSMs 1026

28.2.7 The common criteria 1026

28.2.7.1 The gory details 1027

28.2.7.2 What goes wrong with the Common Criteria 1029

28.2.7.3 Collaborative protection profiles 1031

28.2.8 The 'Principle of Maximum Complacency' 1032

28.2.9 Next steps 1034

28.3 Metrics and dynamics of dependability 1036

28.3.1 Reliability growth models 1036

28.3.2 Hostile review 1039

28.3.3 Free and open-source software 1040

28.3.4 Process assurance 1042

28.4 The entanglement of safety and security 1044

28.4.1 The electronic safety and security of cars 1046

28.4.2 Modernising safety and security regulation 1049

28.4.3 The Cybersecurity Act 2019 1050

28.5 Sustainability 1051

28.5.1 The Sales of goods directive 1052

28.5.2 New research directions 1053

28.6 Summary 1056

Research problems 1057

Further reading 1058

Chapter 29 Beyond "Computer Says No" 1059

Bibliography 1061

Index 1143
ROSS ANDERSON is Professor of Security Engineering at Cambridge University in England. He is widely recognized as one of the world's foremost authorities on security. In 2015 he won the Lovelace Medal, Britain's top award in computing. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering. He is one of the pioneers of the economics of information security, peer-to-peer systems, API analysis and hardware security. Over the past 40 years, he has also worked or consulted for most of the tech majors.