The Economics of Information
Lying and Cheating in Markets and Organizations
1. Edition September 1997
276 Pages, Softcover
Wiley & Sons Ltd
ISBN:
978-0-631-20666-8
John Wiley & Sons
Knowledge is a vital resource which confers strategic advantages on those that possess it, and provides the possibility of misuse and abuse with increasingly dangerous economic consequences.
Preface.
Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.
Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons.
Part II: Signalling.
Part III: Moral Hazard.
Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and
Auctions.
Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule,
Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.
Introduction: Private Information and Hidden Action.
Part I: Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons.
Part II: Signalling.
Part III: Moral Hazard.
Part IV: Mechanism Design: Applications to Bargaining and
Auctions.
Appendix: Brief Notes on Probability Distributions, Baye's Rule,
Expected Utility Theory and Game Theory.
Ian Molho is Reader in Applied Microeconomics in the Department of Economics, University of Newcastle. He was previously a research fellow at the University of Kent and his varied research interests include labor markets, game theory, the economics of information and evolutionary economics.