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John Wiley & Sons Dummett Cover Michael Dummett stands out among his generation as the only British philosopher of language to rival.. Product #: 978-0-7456-2295-8 Regular price: $20.47 $20.47 In Stock

Dummett

Philosophy of Language

Green, Karen

Key Contemporary Thinkers

Cover

1. Edition August 2001
248 Pages, Softcover
Wiley & Sons Ltd

ISBN: 978-0-7456-2295-8
John Wiley & Sons

Further versions

Michael Dummett stands out among his generation as the only British
philosopher of language to rival in stature the Americans, Davidson
and Quine. In conjunction with them he has been responsible for
much of the framework within which questions concerning meaning and
understanding are raised and answered in the late twentieth-century
Anglo-American tradition. Dummett's output has been prolific and
highly influential, but not always as accessible as it deserves to
be. This book sets out to rectify this situation.

Karen Green offers the first comprehensive introduction to
Dummett's philosophy of language, providing an overview and summary
of his most important arguments. She argues that Dummett should not
be understood as a determined advocate of anti-realism, but that
his greatest contribution to the philosophy of language is to have
set out the strengths and weaknesses of the three most influential
positions within contemporary theory of meaning - realism, as
epitomised by Frege, the holism to be found in Wittgenstein, Quine
and Davidson and the constructivism which can be extracted from
Brouwer. It demonstrates that analytic philosophy as Dummett
practices it, is by no means an outmoded approach to thinking about
language, but that it is relevant both to cognitive science and to
phenomenology.

Introduction.

Fregean Foundations.

Sense and Reference in Frege and Dummett.

Truth Assertion and the Central Argument Against Bivalence.

Frege's Platonism.

Frege's Kantian Connections.

The Context Principle.

Wittgenstein and Quine.

The Manifestability Constraint and Rejection of Mentalism.

Dummett and Quine.

Two Challenges: Holism and Strict Finitism.

The Manifestability Constraint and the Priority of Language.

How do Anti-Mentalism and Anti-Psychologism Stand to Each
Other?.

The Influence of Intuitionism .

Brouwer's Intuitionism.

The Intuitionist Case Against Bivalence.

Metaphysical debates and the Theory of Meaning.

The Traditional case for Nominalism and Subjective Idealism.

Moderate Idealism and the Denial of Bivalence.

The Case Against Strict Finitism.

Pure versus Mediated Constructivism: Truth Theories and
Semantics.

A Common-Sense Realist Appropriation of the Argument Against
Bivalence.

The Reality of the Past.

Anti-Realism with Respect to the Past.

Anti-Realism with Respect to the Future.

What Do We Know When We Know A Language?.

Languages and Idiolects.

Davidson on Malapropism and the Social Character of
Meaning.

Psychologism, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind.

On the Relationship of Phenomenology to Analytic Philosophy.

How Close are Frege and Husserl on Sense and Reference?.

Wittgenstein and Intentionality.

Conclusion.

Notes.

Bibliography
'Karen Green has done more than write a study of Dummett's
philosophy of language. She has in effect written a critical
history of the treatment of the theory of meaning by leading
figures from Frege and Wittgenstein on to the present; and she
demonstrates how, in relation to all of them, Dummett has
elaborated his own position, acknowledging what they have severally
contributed while at the same time avoiding their excesses. She
shows how his judiciously selective denial of bivalence generates
an "anti-realism" which is perfectly consistent with the realism of
common sense.' Sir Peter Strawson, University College,
Oxford

'For the student, getting to grips with Michael Dummett's
philosophy can be a formidable task. For Dummett's theses are deep
and challenging, and his arguments for them are subtle and complex.
Karen Green is to be thanked and commended for this lucid and
accessible account of the main features of Dummett's system of
thought. She explains how Dummett has developed theses from Frege
and Wittgenstein, about objectivity, normativity, systematicity,
publicity, and the dependence of thought on language. She traces
also significant points of contact and contention with Husserl,
Brouwer, Quine and Davidson. She explains the anti-realist
misgiving that truth cannot be bivalent for a language in which
meaning derives from use, and does much to prevent the frequent
confusion of anti-realism with subjective idealism or
phenomenalism. All in all, this is a remarkable exposition and
development of the views of one of the most important philosophers
of our age.' Professor Neil Tennant, The Ohio State
University

"Overall, this book demonstrates Green's remarkable
command of the whole of Dummett's writings...Green's discussion of
thhese issues offer a well argued and remarkable cohesive
perspective on the great breadth of Dummett's work." David
Kilfoyle, Philosophy in Review
Karen Green is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Monash University, Australia.

K. Green, Monash University